From Bail Bondsmen to Risk Assessments: Assessing Kentucky\u27s Pretrial Release Approaches by Ceesay, Ismaila
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
MPA/MPP Capstone Projects Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
2016 
From Bail Bondsmen to Risk Assessments: Assessing Kentucky's 
Pretrial Release Approaches 
Ismaila Ceesay 
University of Kentucky, ismaila.ceesay@uky.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds 
 Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the State and Local Government 
Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Ceesay, Ismaila, "From Bail Bondsmen to Risk Assessments: Assessing Kentucky's Pretrial Release 
Approaches" (2016). MPA/MPP Capstone Projects. 267. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/267 
This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy 
and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP Capstone Projects by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
From Bail Bondsmen to Risk Assessments:        
Assessing Kentucky's Pretrial Release Approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
As one of only four states that ban bail bond companies, Kentucky is an experiment in 
the “laboratory of democracy,” which is made even more interesting because the state 
has tried three different approaches to pretrial release—the Pre-1976 approach, the 1976 
to 2011 approach, and the 2011 to present approach. An assessment of these approaches 
shows how state actions and inaction can affect the right to pretrial release and 
underscores the importance of adopting appropriate state pretrial release policies.   
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SECTION I 
A. Introduction1 
“Across this country, there are more people in jail…awaiting court action, 
than any other reason.”2 This is offensive to the concept of “innocent until proven 
guilty”3 and contributed to the reasons why Kentucky made several changes to its 
pretrial release programs beginning with House Bill 254 (HB 254), (hereafter the 
Bail Bond Bill).4 Forty years after the Bail Bond Bill first overhauled Kentucky’s 
pretrial release practices, it is prudent to assess the state’s pretrial release approach 
by asking whether the state’s current pretrial release approach is better than its 
past approaches. Answering such a question calls for a searching look into 
Kentucky’s past and current pretrial release practices.  This research takes that 
searching look and concludes that Kentucky’s current pretrial release practice, 
though imperfect, is the best Kentucky has tried so far. 
                                                 
1 Ismaila Ceesay, J.D. and M.P.A. candidate 2016. Thank you to Dr. Fink and Dr. Toma. 
Thank you to my wife for her patience and support and to our boys for their 
understanding. 
2 Administrative Office of the Courts, 35 Years of Justice in Kentucky, 2011 (in 
conjunction the Pretrial Justice Institute). 
3 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 15 S. Ct. 394 (1895) 
4 H.B. 254, Ky. Acts. 1 (1976), (as codified under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.510 (1) (West 
Supp. 2016)) (abolishing the practice of for-profit bail bond). 
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B. Background 
i. Importance of Pretrial Release to Defendants and their 
Families 
Pretrial release is crucial for a criminal defendant. If denied, it can have 
adverse effects on the defendant, the defendant’s family, their community, and the 
state.  “Until the 1960s, the Courts relied almost exclusively on the traditional 
money bail system.”5 This meant that defendants could only be released pretrial in 
one of three ways: on the defendant’s recognizance, on a secured money bond, or 
on an unsecured money bond. With this approach, the poor were, in essence, 
priced out of pretrial release while those who could afford it bought their pretrial 
release. Such inequity impacted the defendants’ experience in the justice system 
for no reason other than the ability to pay. Furthermore, studies show increased 
challenges in defending against charges in jurisdiction where “money bail only” 
approaches are prevalent.6 
                                                 
5 Marie VanNostrand, Legal and Evidence–Based Practices: Applications of Legal 
Principles, Laws, and Research to the Field of Pretrial Services, Crime & Just. Inst. & 
the Nat’l Inst. of Corr., (2007). 
6 Id. (citing Arthur Beeley, The Bail System in Chicago (new impression ed. 1966)); Note, 
Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1031 (1954))(Money bail is the release of a defendant on the condition money is put 
up to guarantee the defendant’s appearance for future court proceedings).  
 
“What has been demonstrated here is that usually only one factor 
determines whether a defendant stays in jail before he comes to trial. 
That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the crime. It 
is not the character of the defendant. That factor is, simply, money.” 
Robert F. Kennedy 
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Among the challenges faced by defendants 
incarcerated pretrial are the increased likelihood of 
being convicted of a felony when tried and of 
receiving longer sentences than defendants who 
were released pretrial.7 Defendants are likely to 
plead guilty when incarcerated pretrial in order to 
avoid maximum sentences8 or as a desperate effort to get out  
of jail. Prosecutors, who already enjoy inordinate power in the justice system, use 
the threat of bail denial through high dollar bail amounts to induce defendants to 
plead guilty. This imbalance in power is demonstrated the fact that the vast 
majority of cases never make it to trial. National data show that of all the felony 
charges in 2006, 68% were convicted but only 3% of those cases went to trial, 96% 
of those convictions were a result of guilty pleas.9 
It is clear that the 
challenges associated with 
pretrial detention are being 
experienced by more defendants 
than before. The justice system 
has sought progressively higher 
bail amounts since 1998 leading 
                                                 
7 Justice Policy Inst., Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money 
for Bail, (Sept. 2012), (citing Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address at the National 
Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011)). 
8 Id. 
9 State Court Processing Statistics data as retrieved from the Felony Defendants in Large 
Urban Counties reports, 1992 – 2006. 
A plea may be 
particularly appealing 
if the time they have 
already spent in jail 
will count toward the 
prospective 
sentence—Justice 
Policy Institute. 
Figure 1: Increase in Number of Cases 
Assigned  
High Bail Amounts.  
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to more pretrial confinement. Figure 1 shows the Bureau of Justice Statistics data 
that average bail amounts increased by over $30,000 between 1992 and 2006. In 
2006, jail population in the 75 most populous U.S. counties had a median bail 
amount of $10,000 which means that at least half of the population was assigned 
a minimum of $10,000 in bail.   
 
Pretrial incarceration may also have devastating effects on the defendants’ 
families. Those incarcerated pretrial may lose their jobs, housing, and other 
privileges due to their absence.10 Safety nets like healthcare for themselves and 
their families may be lost or put in jeopardy, especially where they are the sole 
providers.11 Their children may have to move out of their homes, which they can 
no longer afford and need to change schools as a result of pretrial incarceration.12 
These social turbulences affect the accused and their families in ways that can 
have deleterious effects on those who were never accused of a crime. These 
observations are made even more objectionable by the fact that such defendants 
are yet to be adjudicated or found guilty by a jury of their peers.  
                                                 
10 Id. at 3 
11 Id.  
12 See Id. 
In October 2013, Kentucky truck driver David Jones was arrested on charges of 
distributing child pornography. He insisted he was innocent, and a judge set his 
bail at $15,000 cash, far above what Jones could pay. That was soon bumped down 
to $2,500 cash, as long as he could secure another $22,500 with personal 
property. Fourteen months after Jones was first jailed, a judge lowered bail to 
just $2,500 cash, which a relative paid and Jones was released. In April 2014, the 
charges were dropped. By then, Jones had lost his job and his apartment and 
missed his son’s high school graduation—The Marshall Project 
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ii. Importance of Pretrial Release to States 
Defendants incarcerated pretrial may lead to states having to provide social 
safety nets for their families in the form of government healthcare, subsidized 
nutrition, and other services. These costs are in addition to the costs of 
incarcerating the defendants pretrial. The situation is made even more acute 
because those incarcerated pretrial are also precluded from contributing to the 
states’ economy. The confluence of these realities has led to ballooning costs of 
incarceration for many states including Kentucky.13 Despite the negative impacts 
on their budgets, states still incarcerate defendants pretrial because of the 
obligation to keep their citizens safe and ensure the carriage of justice. Reducing 
pretrial detention while ensuring public safety and the carriage of justice is a win-
win for the state and defendants. Fewer defendants incarcerated pretrial means 
less state spending and more defendants spared the challenges associated with 
pretrial confinement.  
iii. Importance of Kentucky’s Pretrial Release Approaches 
As one of only five states that does not permit professional bail bond 
companies to operate within their jurisdictions,14 Kentucky is an experiment in the 
“laboratory of democracy.”15 Studying how Kentucky differs in its pretrial release 
approach to other states is a worthwhile exercise in determining the most effective 
                                                 
13 See discussion infra at Section III p. 15 
14 The five states that prohibit professional bail bonds companies are: Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  
15 See, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932) (Justice 
Brandeis dissenting). 
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pretrial release program. The study of Kentucky’s pretrial program is made more 
consequential because Kentucky has tried three distinct approaches to pretrial 
release—the Pre-1976 approach, the 1976 to 2011 approach, and the current 
approach to pretrial release. 
C. Outline of Paper 
This research examines Kentucky’s different approaches to pretrial release 
and the successes it achieved in realizing the constitutional and legislative intents 
of pretrial release. It tracks the major changes in Kentucky’s pretrial release 
program and highlights the reasons for these changes. The paper concludes by 
pointing out areas for improvement in Kentucky’s current pretrial release 
approach and offers suggestions to address these challenges.  
Section I introduces the topic and thesis of the paper and then provides a 
background on why it is important to discuss and understand pretrial release 
programs. The section also highlights the unique opportunity offered by 
Kentucky’s use of different approaches to pretrial release over the decades. Section 
II discusses the constitutional mandates in pretrial release in both the federal 
system and in Kentucky. This Section identifies the constitutional underpinnings 
of pretrial release and answers the question whether pretrial release is an 
individual constitutional right. Section III begins by looking at the challenges that 
hindered the complete abidance to the constitutional requirements of pretrial 
release prior to 1976 and describes Kentucky’s pretrial practices before the passage 
of the Bail Bond Bill.  The section concludes by discussing the passage and results 
of the Bail Bond Bill. Section IV begins by discussing the introduction of 
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assessment tools, which sought to relegate subjective decision-making in favor of 
evidence-based objective decision-making in pretrial release. This section also 
discusses the passage of House Bill 463 (HB 463) (hereafter the Risk Assessment 
Bill),16 and highlights some of its consequential provisions to pretrial release. The 
section concludes with a look at the results of the Risk Assessment Bill. Section V 
concludes the paper by making a determination of which of Kentucky’s approaches 
to pretrial release best achieves the identified constitutional and legislative intent. 
The section also offers recommendations on how to make the state’s current 
practices of pretrial release more effective.  
SECTION II 
A. Federal Constitutional Requirements 
Being a fundamental part of the 
Framer’s concept of liberty, pretrial 
release was made the law of the land by 
The Judiciary Act of 1789. And 
although it has never been interpreted 
by the courts to be an absolute right, it 
is enshrined in the Constitution of the 
United States in the Eight Amendment, 
which prohibits excessive bail, fines, 
and cruel and unusual punishment.17 
                                                 
16 Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, H.B. 463, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ky. 2011) [hereinafter H.B. 463]. 
17 U.S Const. amend. XIII 
“The denial of a citizen’s liberty 
through the arrest process is the 
greatest single power the 
government maintains under the 
United States Constitution. The 
Framers of the Constitution knew 
that this power had been 
historically abused by European 
Governments and took specific 
action in the ‘Bill of Rights’ to 
ensure our government did not 
deny liberty without an 
opportunity for bail unless the 
defendant was charged with an 
offense punishable by death.”—
KPSA Manual, 1978-1980. 
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The Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required”18 of accused 
persons prior to trial. This means that an accused person may be released before 
trial and excessive bail may not be used as a means of denying the accused pretrial 
release. The Supreme Court of the United States, hereafter SCOTUS, explained 
that bail was meant to ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial.19 Judges were able 
to release non-capital defendants on bail and enjoyed great latitude in setting the 
conditions of bail. Subsequent development in the criminal law made it 
permissible to deny bail to defendants deemed too dangerous to release in society.  
In United States v. Salerno, where SCOTUS validated the constitutionality of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984,20 the high court also pointed out that bail conditions only 
run afoul of the Eight Amendment if they are “excessive in light of the perceived 
evil.”21 This meant that if the facts of the case justified it, the possibility of bail may 
be foreclosed for non-capital defendants. 
 
Understanding the federal approach to pretrial release is crucial to 
understanding Kentucky’s bail program. The Federal Constitution sets the floor for 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
20 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Also known as the Bail Reform Act of 1984). 
21 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without 
trial is the carefully limited exception…The Act authorizes the detention 
prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after 
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the 
community which no condition of release can dispel.” 
Justice Rehnquist 
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individual rights for all U.S. citizens but does not impose a ceiling on additional 
individual rights a state constitution may confer. This hierarchy is made possible 
by the Fourteenth and Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution. Under this 
arrangement The Judiciary Acts of 1789 and 1984 and all relevant federal case law 
provide pretrial rights that may not be infringed by Kentucky’s constitution but 
Kentucky may choose to confer more expansive pretrial rights to its defendants.  
B. Kentucky Constitutional Requirement 
Similar to the federal law, Kentucky permits bail for non-capital defenders 
but also allows the denial of bail where a defendant is considered too dangerous to 
be released to the public. Section 16 of the Kentucky Constitution states that “[a]ll 
prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless for capital offenses when 
the proof is evident or the presumption great.”22 Section 17 of the Kentucky 
Constitution further explains that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.” These constitutional 
provisions are understood to be guiding principles similar to the Eight 
Amendment. In Adkins v. Regan, Kentucky’s highest court explained that “[t]he 
generally recognized objective of a peace bond is not to deprive of liberty but to 
exact security for the keeping of the peace.”23 The court went on to hold that “[if] 
the amount required is so excessive as to be prohibitory, the result is a denial of 
bail,”24 which is prohibited. The same court also said in Long v. Hamilton that 
“[e]ach case comprises a set of facts and circumstances peculiar to it and there is 
                                                 
22 Ky. Const. § 16. 
23 Adkins v. Regan, 313 Ky. 695, 700, 233 S.W.2d 402 (1950) (emphasis added). 
24 Id. 
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no rule of law which will automatically determine for every case the amount of bail 
which may be required without violation of the prohibition against 
excessiveness.”25  
Kentucky law may be summarized to permit the detention of a defendant 
pending trial if it is determined that the defendant is too dangerous to be released 
to the community.26 A notable difference between the federal and Kentucky 
pretrial release approaches is the requirement of “sufficient securities”27 in the 
Kentucky Constitution versus a prohibition of “excessive bail” in the US 
Constitution.28 This suggests that the Federal Law does not require monetary bail 
while Kentucky law does. It is clear, in both the Federal and Kentucky 
constitutional provisions, that if a bond is required, it may not be excessive. Hence 
the four main constitutional principles of bail in both Kentucky and the federal 
system are:  
a. Bail is a right in non-capital offenses;  
b. Bail may not be excessive; 
c. Bail is meant to ensure the appearance of the defendant in 
court proceedings;29 and 
d. Dangerous defendants may be denied bail.30 
 
                                                 
25 Long v. Hamilton, 467 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1971) (emphasis added). 
26 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.066(2) (West Supp. 2013). 
27 Ky. Const. § 16. 
28 U.S. Const. amend. XIII. 
29 Timothy R. Schnacke et al., Pretrial Justice Inst., The History of Bail and 
Pretrial Release, 5 (2010) (citing Spurgeon Kennedy et al., Pretrial Servs. Res. Ctr., 
Pretrial Release and Supervision Program: Training Supplement, 2 (1997)). 
30 Dangerousness may be to a specific person i.e. a potential witness to a crime or to the 
general public. 
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SECTION III 
A. Bail Bondsmen—Seeking Profits from Detained Defendants 
With the constitutional underpinnings of pretrial release as a backdrop, the 
pretrial program in Kentucky pre-1976 was very troubling. The state had no 
program of its own to handle pretrial bail and permitted professional bail bond 
companies to fill the void. These companies became so integrated into the state’s 
judicial system that they were the only means of pretrial release for many.31  
                                                 
31 See supra note 2 (Governor Carroll explaining the level of opposition to HB 254 by the 
professional bondsmen).  
 
 
Courier-Journal News Reports of Harassment by Bail Bond Companies 
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While enjoying the state’s imprimatur, their sole motive was profit. Use of 
extrajudicial means to secure clients and ensure payments was commonplace. The 
preamble to the Bail Bond Bill evokes scenes from a Wild West movie with hired 
guns rounding up bail jumpers with orders to bring them in dead or alive. It reads 
as a serious indictment to the existence of the bail bond companies and 
underscored the corrosive effect they had in Kentucky’s justice system.   
“WHEREAS, bail bondsmen have, in large part, 
pre-empted those constitutional mandates and have 
reaped huge profits from the bail bonding business to 
the detriment of the rights of many citizens and have 
been a major cause of corruption in the administration 
of justice; and 
WHEREAS, the present system has become so 
dominated by the bail bondsmen that pretrial release 
of defendants on their own recognizances in cases 
involving minor offenses has been discouraged without 
regard to the likelihood that most defendants will 
appear as ordered by the court if released on their 
own recognizances, all for the purpose of creating 
profits for the bail bondsmen; and 
WHEREAS, in many instances the present 
system financially burdens lower income persons 
charged with minor offenses by virtually requiring 
them to pay for the services of a bail bondsman 
without regard to the likelihood that they will appear 
as ordered by the court if released on their own 
recognizances; and 
WHEREAS, the present system has otherwise fostered 
wide-spread abuse of the laws and of the rights of the citizens of 
this Commonwealth through the corruptive influences of the bail 
bondsman in violation of the spirit of the Kentucky Constitution 
guaranteeing the equal administration of justice.                 
Preamble to the Bail Bond Bill. 
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B. Obstacles—Resistance to the Bail Bond Bill  
The Bail Bond Bill intended to do away with professional bonding 
companies and it was met with stiff resistance. The bonding companies, 
prosecutors, judges, and jailers cried foul and tried to stop the legislation as they 
successfully did before. The reasons for resistance for some in law enforcement, 
especially judges, stemmed from the notion that the proposed changes were a 
move towards being soft on crime. But there were also charges of some law 
enforcement officials being in the pocket of the bondsmen and resisting out of self-
interest.32  
However, there was no mistaking the bail bond companies’ stance on the 
matter. They did all they could to derail the bill. They tried bribery, blackmail, 
threats, and political smears to scuttle the bill without success. Governor Carroll, 
the champion of the Bail Bond Bill, took the brunt of their fury. He was accused of 
pushing the bill as a retaliation for being refused campaign donations.33 Members 
of his staff were offered cash34 to help derail the bill and his family’s safety was 
threatened35 requiring twenty-four-hour security by the state police for his two 
daughters who were attending Murray State University at the time.36  
The Bail Bond Bill succeeded mainly because the bill’s champion was a 
governor and not just a legislator, as was the case the in previous attempts. 
                                                 
32 See supra note 4.  
33 Ed Ryan, Defenders of Bail System Assail Carroll’s proposal, Courier J., January 1976.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
  - 14 - 
Governor Carroll37 marshaled broad support, including leaders in both chambers 
of the General Assembly, the Kentucky Bar Association, several prominent judges 
and prosecutors, and defense attorneys. The coalition of support held firm and saw 
the bill through despite the onslaught from opponents. The bill’s promised was “to 
provide for a uniform workable system for affording persons charged with bailable 
offenses their constitutional rights to pretrial release that will insure appearances 
as ordered by the courts without imposing undue hardships upon those persons.”38 
Thus, the legislative intent behind pretrial release closely mirrored the Kentucky’s 
constitutional mandate.  
C. Results from the Bail Bond Bill—HB 254 
Although the Bail Bond Bill tried to address the role of money in pretrial 
release by abolishing the bail bond companies, which perpetrated all “manner of 
evil,”39 money still continued to play a role in Kentucky’ pretrial release. Old habits 
die hard and some judges still preferred money bails for pretrial release. 
Defendants were still being released mainly on money or property bonds, which 
had disparate effects on the poor, the same population that suffered the most from 
the practices of the erstwhile bail bond companies.  
The new law created the Kentucky Pretrial Services Agency (KPSA) as part 
of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and made it the anchor for pretrial 
services. The new pretrial process was supposed to work in the following way: An 
                                                 
37 Governor Carroll failed in his attempts to substantially regulate the bail bond 
companies as a legislator from Lexington.  
38 See note 3 (Preamble). 
39 Id.  
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arrested and charged person will be transferred into corrections custody and have 
a bond set by a judge within twenty-four hours of being arrested unless the charge 
is a capital offense.40 The KPSA would prepare a report on the defendant through 
an interview to determine the likelihood of: (1) a failure to appear for future 
proceedings (FTA) and (2) new criminal acts (NCA). Amongst the factors 
considered are the defendant’s ties to the community, criminal record, and ability 
to afford bond.  A judge considers the Pretrial Service Report, but has the 
discretion to deviate from it, and then decides whom to release and under what 
conditions. A judge’s decision to deny bail or set a prohibitive bail is given a very 
deferential standard of review—abuse of discretion—when challenged. The bond 
hearing may be done electronically if it is not possible to see a judge within the 
twenty-four hours but if a defendant is denied bond and not released, he/she will 
appear before a judge for an initial appearance where the judge will inform the 
defendant of the right to enter a plea, have counsel appointed if indigent, and set 
the next court hearing.  If bail is set, the judge may allow the defendant to put up 
10% of the amount in order to be released and if the conditions of bail were 
fulfilled, that amount would be returned minus 10%, which was considered an 
administrative fee. A defendant failing to fulfill bail conditions increases his/her 
criminal charges and may be asked to remit the whole amount of bail and be 
incarcerated.  
                                                 
40 See Ky. Const. § 16; Ky. R. Crim. P. 4.02(1); Kentucky Supreme Court Order 2012–12, 
Emergency Suspension of 12–hour time restriction imposed by RCrs 4.20(1), available at 
http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/Rules_ Procedures/201212.pdf  
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Another dimension of the financial concerns in Kentucky’s new pretrial 
release practices was the cost of abolishing the professional bond companies. The 
legislative debate prior to the Bail Bond Bill’s passage included the wisdom of 
abolishing a practice that cost nothing to the state in favor of a program that would 
impose a financial burden to the state. Defenders of professional bondsmen 
highlighted this argument in an attempt to appeal to fiscally minded legislators to 
no avail. Projections of what the KPSA would cost Kentucky ranged from $6 
million to $40 million depending on whom you asked but proponents of the bill 
made promises that the new KPSA would not be a financial burden to the state. 
Furthermore, abolishing the bondsmen caused the loss of jobs of 232 licensed 
bonding agents in the state and an additional 800 employees in support 
positions.41 The impact of economics on the passage of the Bail Bond Bill should 
not be overlooked as an overarching concern for the state in the 1970s was the 
ballooning prison population and rising costs resulting from the war on drugs.42  
Although this research was unable to find reliable data on the changes that 
the Bail Bond Bill ushered in, reports and news stories from local newspapers paint 
a very informative picture. Despite the persisting challenges still plaguing pretrial 
release in Kentucky, e.g. poor defendants having no way of posting bail in the 
absence of a professional bail bond company, the new pretrial approach was 
preferable. The state’s justice system was freed of the fetters imposed by the 
bondsmen and only officials of the judiciary had a say on who was released pretrial. 
                                                 
41 Ed Ryan, Defenders of Bail System Assail Carroll’s proposal, Courier J., January 1976. 
42 See Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a 
"Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93 Ky. L.J. 305, 323 (2005). 
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Gone were the days when a judge’s relationship with the bail bond companies 
affected pretrial release decisions.43 Bail bond agents no longer harassed and 
terrorized defendants and their families when a court proceeding was missed.44 
And the instances of theft in order to pay a bail bond company were eliminated.45 
As to the problems that the state still faced in pretrial release, the state’s next 
criminal code reform would aim to rectify them along with several other concerns. 
SECTION IV 
A. Risk Assessment Bill: Injecting Objectivity in Pretrial Release 
In addition to the challenges faced by Kentucky’s pretrial release program, 
the state was also facing a lot of pressure from its prison population. “Kentucky’s 
inmate population saw a 45% growth between 2000 and 2010, compared with 13 
percent in the US prison system as a whole.”46 This increase took place while the 
crime rate remained at 1974 levels in Kentucky. The increase in inmates led to an 
increase in incarceration spending from $140 million in fiscal year 1990 to $440 
million in fiscal year 2010, a 314% increase in spending.47 The state saw pretrial 
release as an area where some savings can be made. With another major effort, 
Kentucky reformed its criminal laws and introduced a major change in its pretrial 
release practice in 2011. The reform vehicle, Public Safety and Offender 
                                                 
43 See supra note 2. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Pretrial Justice Institute, Safe, Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice is Crucial to Law 
Enforcement, http://www.pretrial.org/safe-fair-and-effective-pretrial-justice-is-crucial-
to-law-enforcement/. 
47 See Legis. Research Comm'n, Report of the Task Force on the Penal Code and 
Controlled Substances Act, Research Memorandum No. 506, at r (ky.20n). 
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Accountability Act (HB 463), (herein referred to as the Risk Assessment Bill),48 
was meant to “maintain public safety and hold offenders accountable while 
reducing recidivism and criminal behavior”.49 The Risk Assessment Bill 
mandated the state “utilize evidence-based practices to reduce the likelihood of 
future criminal behavior.”50 In essence, the state was implementing a practice 
that preferred the predictability of algorithms over the subjective determination 
of judges in making pretrial release decisions.  
B. Resistance to Change 
As could be expected, the proposal to yet again change Kentucky’s pretrial 
practices was resisted by some in spite of the Bill’s bi-partisan support in 
Frankfort.51 But the resistance was 
negligible in comparison to the 
resistance staged against the Bail 
Bond Bill. Some of the resistance could be attributed a hawkish belief in the adage, 
“if you do the crime you have to do the time.” A natural reluctance to deviate from 
the tried and true, which may be explained by the term “local legal culture” also 
                                                 
48 H.B. 463, ch. 2, Ky. Acts. 4 (2011) (as codified in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 196.288(1) 
(West Supp. 2013)). 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 See Tara Boh Klute & Mark Heyerly, Ky. Pretrial Servs., Report on Impact of House Bill 
463: Outcomes, Challenges and Recommendations 4–6 (2012). 
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may contributed to the resistance.52 Some prosecutors and judges rehashed the 
familiar arguments that the changes proposed by the Risk Assessment Bill were a 
soft on crime approach, which was anathema to some. 
C. The Risk Assessment Tool—The Use of Data in Pretrial Release 
Risk assessment tool research and development began in the 1950s.53 The 
instruments used data collected from many jurisdictions to identify predictive 
characteristics that affect FTAs and NCAs. KPSA utilized the pretrial risk 
assessment tool by collecting extensive personal information about defendants 
through an interview and investigation.54 After  defendants’ identity was confirmed 
by a third party, 55 the KPSA worker would put together data that included the 
defendants’ residency history, work history and status, current charge, legal status, 
any substance abuse history, any criminal record, any prior FTAs, mental health 
history, community and family ties, educational level, and any prior escape 
convictions.56 The risk assessment tool helps KPSA categorizes defendants 
according to risk level as follows: low risk of FTA, moderate risk of FTA, or high 
risk of FTA. This information is then given to a judge with a recommendation that, 
(1) defendants considered low risk be released on unsecured bond or personal 
recognizance, (2) defendants deemed moderate risk be released under the same 
conditions as a low risk defendant with the addition of supervision like GPS 
                                                 
52 See Francis T. Cullen et al., Eight Lessons from Moneyball: The High Cost of 
Ignoring Evidence– Based Corrections, 4 Victims & Offenders 197, 210–11 (2009). 
53 Cynthia A. Mamalian, Pretrial Justice Inst., State of the Science of Pretrial Risk 
Assessment 7 (2011). 
54 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.515 (West Supp. 2013). 
55 93 Id. app. B, at 3. See also Ky. R. Crim. P. 4.06. 
56 See Klute & Heyerly, supra note 51. 
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monitoring or controlled substance testing, and (3) high risk defendants be dealt 
with as the judge sees fit using the Kentucky Supreme Court’s guidelines.  
Utilizing a risk assessment tool did not change Kentucky’s criminal trial 
process as outlined in Section III. Rather, the bill changed the method in which 
KPSA reached its recommendation and significantly buttressed the impact of 
KPSA’s report in pretrial release decisions. Judges were expected to consider and 
abide by KPSA’s pretrial report unless they have a subjective reason to deviate from 
it under KRS section 431.066.57 Judges may decline to follow KPSA’s 
recommendations by reducing in writing their objections to the recommendations. 
Upon appellate review, the standard of review would still be an abuse of discretion, 
as it was under the Bail Bond Bill, but the reviewing court would now have the 
benefit of a written record to review. Hence, the hope is that trial judges will be 
more mindful of whom to deny bail.  
D. Results from The Risk Assessment Bill—HB 463 
Prior to passing the Risk Assessment, Kentucky experimented with risk 
assessment tools created for other jurisdictions. The successes from these 
experimental uses contributed to the establishment of a bipartisan task force to 
look at Kentucky’s prison admissions data. The task force commissioned the JFA 
Institute to validate Kentucky’s risk assessment tool and that validation offered an 
invaluable opportunity to assess Kentucky’s risk assessment tool. Figure 2 
illustrates the predictive strength of the assessment tool. The data suggest that the 
                                                 
57 Id.; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.520 (West Supp. 2013). 
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risk assessment tool was very accurate in predicting FTAs and NCAs for low risk 
offenders but was overly cautious in predicting NCAs for high risk defendants. The 
predictive strength of the model weakens as the number of defendants released 
and time-span increases.  
Figure 2: Comparison Between Predictive Model and Actual Results 
  
2011 Predictive 
Model 
Nov. 2012 to 
Oct. 2013 
Jul. 2013 to 
Jun. 2015 
  FTA NCA FTA NCA FTA NCA 
Low Risk 5% 8% 5% 8% 9% 7% 
Moderate Risk 10% 16% 10% 15% 18% 12% 
High Risk 19% 25% 19% 14% 23% 16% 
Data from KPSA courtesy of Tara Blair 
 
Confidence in the risk assessment was not felt statewide. Some counties 
utilized the tool and increased their pretrial release while others did not. This 
discrepancy is illustrated by Appendix B: Outline Map of Kentucky 120 Counties 
and their Release Rates.58 These data suggest that many counties still relied on 
judges’ discretion and money bail. Defendants’ in such counties would have fared 
better at the time of the bail bondsmen because they could have secured their 
release albeit by getting into debt with a bondsman.  
 
 
                                                 
58 Robert Veldman, Note, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Impact of 
House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its Implementation, 102 Ky. L.J. 777-813 
(2014). 
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Section V  
A. Analysis 
The stated goals of Kentucky Pretrial Service Agency are, “[t]o assist the 
court in making informed pretrial release decisions, to effectively supervise 
defendants in order to support safe communities and to ensure that defendants 
meet court obligations while maintaining the constitutional presumption of 
innocence and the right to reasonable bail.” 59 These are laudable goals and provide 
a fair barometer to judge Kentucky’s three approaches to pretrial release. 
                                                 
59 Kentucky Court of Justice website, Pretrial Service,  
http://courts.ky.gov/courtprograms/pretrialservices/Pages/default.aspx 
 (emphasis added).  
 
 
The lowest average county release rate in Kentucky between June 2011 and 
June 2013 was McCracken County at 46.48%. The highest average release 
rate over the same time period was Russell County at 84.93%. These figures 
are not outliers. Seventy–nine counties had an average release rate below the 
69.35% state average and seven counties had release rates above 80%. 
Demographics cannot be used to justify the disparities. Counties with similar 
communities had dissimilar release rates. For example, Jefferson County 
released 69.54% of its 92,921 total cases from June 2011 to June 2013. 
Fayette County, the next largest caseload, released 47.46% of its 30,356 
total cases. Similarly, adjacent rural counties also differ greatly. Rockcastle 
County released 74.85% of its 2,433 total cases while Lincoln County 
released 53.24% of its 2,453 total cases. 
Veldman 
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Kentucky’s pre-1976 approach to pretrial release was a disaster and offers 
only lessons of how not to approach pretrial release. The justice system was 
compromised by an industry whose tentacles penetrated deep enough to have 
judges in their pockets for the purpose of setting high bail amounts for defendants 
who could not afford it.60 The Bail Bond Bill brought about needed change and its 
results show that the worst symptoms of the that era were eradicated with the 
abolition of the bail bond industry.  
The introduction of the risk assessment tool into the state’s pretrial release 
program was experimental and it eventually got pursued statewide because of the 
its perceived success. But the program had its drawbacks. It was meant to save the 
state money by reducing the number of defendants jailed but the state continues 
to outpace national incarceration rates. Evidence of subjectivity was rampant as 
similar counties show very different release rates indicating that the application of 
justice was not uniform in the state.  However, the introduction of objectivity into 
the pretrial release decision, no matter how minimal and uneven, was an 
improvement.  
Kentucky is seen as a leader in pretrial release reform and has collaborated 
with organizations to create assessment tools. One such collaboration is with the 
Arnold Foundation and it yielded an assessment tool called the Public Safety 
Assessment-Court (PSA-Court).61 The PSA-Court uses only nine data points 
                                                 
60 See supra note 2 
61 TJAF, Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, 2013 (in 
collaboration with the Arnold Institute). 
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instead of the fourteen that Kentucky’s prior assessment required. This is seen as 
an improvement by pretrial service practitioners but it also poses significant 
concerns. Because of proprietary interests, the special calculations or algorithms 
that formed Kentucky’s prior assessment tools were never disclosed and the PSA-
Court is no different. Few independent verifications of these tools have been made, 
making the assessment tool a black box that no one can access let alone challenge. 
We should be concerned about the accuracy of the data in these instruments 
especially knowing how shorthanded and overworked the justice system 
employees are. Basing pretrial release decisions on a machine using secretive 
methods has the feel of science fiction but there is nothing fictional about the 
possible repercussions of bail denial to a defendant.  
B. Recommendations 
Kentucky still struggles with pretrial release because it has not managed to 
entrenched in the justice system as well as the bail bondsmen were. The following 
recommendations will help in make pretrial release a presumption in Kentucky as 
the Kentucky Constitution and the Kentucky legislature intended:  
1. Amend the Kentucky Constitution to permit non-money bonds and then 
eliminate money bonds for misdemeanor crimes;  
2. Change the Kentucky Supreme Court’s rule of an abuse of discretion 
standard of review for a denial of bail to a de novo standard; and  
3. Encourage prosecutors to consider Kentucky Pretrial Service Agency’s 
pretrial release report in agreeing or opposing bail. 
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The Kentucky Constitution requires the posting of “sufficient securities”62 
for a bailable offense. This is a hurdle in creating a regime of non-money bailable 
offenses. The legislature should amend the Constitution and then eliminate money 
bails for all misdemeanors. Eliminating this class of crimes from pretrial 
incarcerations will reduce the jail population where it is most needed. It will do so 
without endangering the public or substantially increasing FTAs because 
misdemeanor crimes are not crimes whose perpetrators are likely to be dangerous 
to the public. Furthermore, the punishment for bail jumping is sufficient 
deterrence for most defendants accused of misdemeanors.  
If a judge’s decision to deny bail is reviewed by an appellate court, the 
standard of review should be a de novo standard63 instead of an abuse of discretion 
standard. This will require the Kentucky Supreme Court to change its rule and will 
put a fresh set of eyes on the facts of a case where bail is sought but denied. Such a 
rule change will cause trial courts to be cautious about denying pretrial release 
especially when combined with the requirement that their reason to deny pretrial 
release be memorialized in writing.   
The next most consequential actors in pretrial release, after judges, are 
prosecutors and they need to be encouraged to create a culture of pretrial release. 
With their wide discretion and complete immunity, prosecutors are able to use 
pretrial release as a weapon against defenders and it will be an uphill battle to have 
                                                 
62 See supra 22 
63 Dictionary Law.com, “De novo” means starting over, as in a trial de novo. An appellate 
body looks at the facts of the case instead of relying on the findings of a lower court. 
Available at http://dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=489#ixzz48YLqoJD9. 
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them give up such an effective tool. However, a prosecutor’s job is to see that justice 
is carried out and if incarcerating defendants pretrial has a tendency to minimize 
the possibility of that happening, then it should be avoided whenever possible. 
Prosecutors should be encouraged to consult and consider KPSA’s pretrial release 
report before opposing any bail.  
These recommendations will improve Kentucky’s pretrial release approach 
and keep the state at the forefront of pretrial justice for defendants. They will 
minimize the number of defendants incarcerated pretrial, which will save the state 
money, protect defendants from the pitfalls of pretrial incarceration, and spare 
families the evils that may arise from a breadwinner being incarcerated pretrial. 
These recommendations will also ensure the statutory intent of Kentucky’s laws 
and protect the constitutional rights of defendants.  
C. Conclusion 
Kentucky’s current pretrial release is the best approach the state has tried. 
The first did not cost the state money and the second was experimental. Currently, 
not all defendants enjoy the benefits of Kentucky’s improved pretrial processes. 
For KPSA to oversee a uniform application of pretrial release across the state, the 
legislature, Judiciary, and Executive branches need to make changes in the way 
they currently deal with pretrial release. Kentucky’s forty-year experiment shows 
that it is not easy to change an entrenched state practice but it is possible. 
 I 
APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Section 431.066. Pretrial release and bail options of 
verified and eligible defendant—Assessment of flight risk, likelihood of 
appearing at trial, and risk of danger—Credit toward bail for time in 
jail. 
i. For purposes of this section, “verified and eligible defendant” 
means a defendant who pretrial services is able to interview 
and assess, and whose identity pretrial services is able to 
confirm through investigation. 
ii. When a court considers pretrial release and bail for an 
arrested defendant, the court shall consider whether the 
defendant constitutes a  
i. flight risk,  
ii. is unlikely to appear for trial, or 
iii. is likely to be a danger to the public if released.  
In making this determination, the court shall consider the pretrial risk 
assessment for a verified and eligible defendant along with the factors set 
forth in KRS 431.525. 
i. If a verified and eligible defendant poses low risk of flight, is 
likely to appear for trial, and is not likely to be a danger to 
others, the court shall order the defendant released on 
unsecured bond or on the defendant’s own recognizance 
subject to such other conditions as the court may order. 
ii. If a verified and eligible defendant poses a moderate risk of 
flight, has a moderate risk of not appearing for trial, or poses 
a moderate risk of danger to others, the court shall release the 
defendant under the same conditions as in subsection (3) of 
this section but shall consider ordering the defendant to 
participate in global positioning system monitoring, 
controlled substance testing, increased supervision, or such 
other conditions as the court may order. 
iii.   
1. The provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not 
apply to: 
1. Any person convicted of, pleading guilty to, or entering 
an Alford plea to a felony offense under KRS Chapter 
510, KRS 529.100 involving commercial sexual 
activity, KRS 530.020, 530.064(1)(a), 531.310, or 
531.320, or who is a violent offender as defined in KRS 
439.3401; or 
2. A defendant who is found by the court to present a 
flight risk or to be a danger to others. 
 II 
i. If a court determines that a defendant shall not be released 
pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, the court shall 
document the reasons for denying the release in a written 
order. 
 
(Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.066 (West Supp. 2013) (emphasis added)). 
 III 
Appendix B: Outline Map of Kentucky 120 Counties and their Pretrial 
Robert Veldman, Note, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Impact of House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its 
Implementation, 102 Ky. L.J. 777-813 (2014). 
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Appendix C:  Constitutional Authorities 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” 
 
Kentucky Constitution §16 
 
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless for capital offenses when 
the proof is evident or the presumption great. 
 
Kentucky Constitution §17 
 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment 
inflicted” 
 
Federal Law: 18 U.S.C §3141-3150 
 
“There is a presumption of pretrial release ‘unless the judicial officer determines that 
such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will 
endanger the safety of any person or the community.’ 
i. The judicial officer must impose the least restrictions which will 
assure personal appearance and the safety of the public.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V 
Appendix D: Legal Terminology Explained 
Imprimatur—explicit approval of the state. 
Standard of Review—the level of scrutiny applied by an appellate court on a lower 
court’s decision. 
Compelling Evidence Standard—a standard of review that is more rigorous than a mere 
preponderance of evidence. 
De Novo—an appellate review where a reviewing court looks at all the relevant evidence 
to determine if a lower court made the right determination.  
Difference between Bail and Pretrial Release—Bail is a form of pretrial release. There 
are other pretrial releases that are not bails e.g. executive release. 
Difference between Prisons and Jails—Prisons are long term facilities that typically hold 
adjudicated felons while jails are locally operated, short term facilities that hold inmates 
awaiting court proceedings or sentenced to less than a year. A majority of jail inmates 
are yet to be tried. 
SCOTUS—Supreme Court of the United States 
FTA—Failure to Appear 
NCA—New Criminal Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
